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Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and 
Opportunities for Sustainable Development 
 
by Matt Goodlaw, Paul Alexander, and Jessica Nixon 
OPEC is in the business of natural resources which inherently connects them to the concept of 
sustainable development. The main focus of this research is to answer the following question: 
Does OPEC have the power to implement measures consistent with the concept of sustainable 
development? During the course of this research, the paper Sustainable Development and 
OPEC, by Herman E. Daly, was uncovered. Daly proposes a sink tax to be implemented by 
OPEC. This would act as a global fiduciary which would, in theory, bring the consumption level 
of oil down to a more sustainable level by raising the price and lowering the demand. The 
research in this paper finds that Daly’s speculative idea, while interesting, is unrealistic; the 
idea is not feasible given OPECs’ stated goals. In addition, there are ethical considerations 
concerning a conflict of interest on a global and local scale 
. 
 
Introduction 
The purpose of this research is to illustrate 
the relationship between OPEC and the 
concept of sustainable development. 
Included in the introduction is a brief history 
of OPEC, a brief history of the debate on 
sustainable development, and a review of 
literature pertaining to the field of 
sustainable development. The research 
progresses on to a neo-classical analysis of 
the oil market (supply and demand, 
available oil, and the rate of discovery), by 
which the researchers will illustrate OPEC’s 
control in the oil market in relation to non-
OPEC control variables. The paper will 
determine whether or not OPEC currently 
has the power to implement policy to enact 
sustainable development. Given OPEC’s 
oligopolistic market structure coupled with a 
short-term inelastic demand (lack of 
substitutes) and long-term elastic demand 
(substitutes, renewable energy sources, 
backstop technology), the research will 
explore policy options that may lead to a 
model of sustainable development. Ethical 
concerns arising out of such models-as they 
pertain globally-will be discussed from our 
personal perspectives. The researchers will 
briefly discuss how these models will affect 
us locally, thus leading us to the conclusion. 
In the conclusion, the research will be 
summarized and the relationship between 
OPEC and sustainable development re-
illustrated.  
 
History of the Debate on Sustainable 
Development 
The term ‘sustainable development’ was 
popularized in 1987 after the Bruntland 
Report, “Our Common Future,” was 
published. The Bruntland Report, for the 
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first time, gave some “direction for 
comprehensive global solutions” 
(International Institute for Sustainable 
Development). Though the term was 
popularized in 1987, the concept had been 
brewing for quite some time. In 1962, 
Rachel Carson published Silent Spring 
which connected human and animal health 
risks with pesticides. Carson also shed light 
on the fact that the ecosystem had an 
absorption capacity for economic 
development. 
Over the next decade, an 
environmental consciousness began to 
emerge in the form of global political action. 
First came The Club of Rome in 1968. Then 
in 1969 the U.S. passed the National 
Environment Policy Act (NEPA). In 1972 
the United Nations Environment Programme 
(UNEP) was formed, as well as 
Environment and Development Action 
(EDNA) in the Third World (IISD, 1997). 
The 1980’s and 90’s proved to be 
formative years for the concept of 
sustainable development with both “The 
North:South-A Program for Survival,” 
(Brandt Report) and the above mentioned 
Bruntland Report. In 1992, the U.N. 
Conference on Environment and 
Development (UNCED) was held in Rio de 
Janeiro. (IISD, 1997) In 2002, the (WSSD), 
World Summit on Sustainable Development, 
was held in Johannesburg, South Africa. 
 
History of OPEC 
The Organization of Petroleum of Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) was developed in 1960. 
Founded by Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Venezuela, 
and Saudi Arabia. Over the next 11 years, 
OPEC formed into a thirteen, now eleven, 
nation cartel. This includes Qatar (1961) and 
Libya (1962), Indonesia (1962), United 
Arab Emirates (1967), Algeria (1969), 
Nigeria (1971) (Rousseau). 
In the 1970’s the world explicitly felt 
the power OPEC had gained. Both in 1973 
and later in 1979, OPEC demonstrated how 
dependent the world was on the ‘Black 
Gold’ they possessed. Developed countries 
were vulnerable to production interruptions. 
Global economies (primarily the U.S.) 
reflected such vulnerability on October 6, 
1973 when the fourth Arab-Israeli war 
erupted. (Balaam, Veseth, 365) The details 
of these “oil shocks” will be discussed 
further in the paper. 
 
Literature Review 
OPEC provides an important resource to the 
whole world. This topic is of interest to us 
because oil has a significant effect on our 
lives in an industrial society. What happens 
CS&P Vol 1, Num 2  May 2003 
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if the oil supply is depleted? What does 
OPEC think about the future and their 
oligopoly? The books and articles the 
present research has uncovered describe 
how sustainable development relates to 
OPEC and illustrates some ethical 
considerations dealing with this topic.  
In the book Sustainable 
Development, Michael Redclift concludes 
that sustainable development deals with our 
environment because humanity is using up 
the available natural resources in keeping 
businesses afloat. If the environment and 
how it changes were understood, society 
could then change along with it. He also 
describes “the neo-classical case is that the 
‘gains from trade’ outweigh the losses.” (56) 
A consciousness of our use of natural 
resources is needed.  
Another vital source to understand 
Sustainable Development is the search on 
Herman Daly’s article “Sustainable 
Development: Definitions, Principles, 
Policies”. This article discusses the effects 
of micro- and macro-economics. It suggests 
that wealth is necessary up to the point it 
turns to a throughput whereby it then 
becomes “uneconomic growth” that doesn’t 
work for macro-economists. Sustainable 
Development of the economy means 
qualitative improvement (development), 
without quantitative increase in matter-
energy throughput (growth) beyond the 
absorptive and regenerative capacities of the 
sustaining ecosystem (Daly). Matter-Energy 
Throughput is the flow of raw materials 
from their place in nature, back to nature. 
The ability of the ecosystem to sustain these 
flows must be kept up. Especially for 
underdeveloped poor countries, the main 
source of their Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) is from shelter, food, and clothing. 
Surviving solely on that can still be an 
economic way of living. Daly describes that 
the poor export primary goods to the rich, 
wherefore the rich give loans to the poor, 
gaining a hold over the country and being 
one up from them, having control over the 
entire trade situation. 
Thirdly, Thomas C. Brown, Dawn 
Nannini, Robert B. Gorter, Paul A. Bell and 
George L. Peterson wrote a journal article 
for Ecological Economics titled “Judged 
Seriousness of Environmental Losses: 
Reliability and Cause of Loss”. The group 
tested people in the expectation of 
determining whether or not individuals are 
affected by environmental loss. Some people 
felt no effect from environmental loss but 
most felt a serious loss. The general finding 
was that there was serious feeling of loss 
when man rather than natural events created 
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destruction to the environment. The authors 
also concluded that separate resources are 
valued more in destruction than multiple 
resources that have been ruined.  
Finally, Sir John Hicks, in Value and 
Capital defined income as follows: 
“The purpose of income calculations in 
practical affairs is to give people an 
indication of the amount which they can 
consume without impoverishing 
themselves. Following out this idea, it 
would seem that we ought to define a 
man’s income as the maximum value 
which he can consume during a week, and 
still expect to be as well off at the end of 
the week as he was at the beginning. Thus, 
when a person saves, he plans to be better 
off in the future; when he lives beyond his 
income, he plans to be worse off.” 
 
This definition is as close as Neo-
Classical economics comes to dealing with 
sustainable development. The reality of this 
definition shows that Neo-Classical 
economics is interested only in sustaining 
consumption and economic growth (as 
defined below) indefinitely. 
 
OPEC and Sustainable Development 
The fact that OPEC is in the business of 
natural resources inherently connects them 
to the concept of sustainable development. 
Oil and petroleum play a crucial part in 
economic development - the opposite of 
sustainable development - because they fuel 
economic growth. Economic development, 
as defined by the U.S. Department of 
Commerce, is: 
“an increase in the rate of economic 
growth, measured in terms of changes in 
output or income per capita. The theory 
has two essential dynamics. One, in 
aggregate models, the rate of saving that 
supports investment and capital formation 
drives the growth process. Two, in 
regional models, factor prices--
specifically, the relative returns on 
investment and relative wage rates--
stimulate factor flows that result in 
regional growth. Growth theory suggests 
that economic developers respect the free 
market and do what is necessary to support 
the efficient allocation of resources and 
the operation of the price mechanism” 
(U.S. Dept. of Commerce). 
 
 Using this definition, economic 
development focuses on quantitative growth 
while Daly’s definition of sustainable 
development highlights qualitative 
improvement. With that in mind, what can 
CS&P Vol 1, Num 2  May 2003 
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OPEC do to help in the development of a 
working model of sustainable development? 
 
OPEC and the Oil Market: An Economic 
Analysis of OPEC Power 
OPEC has been accused of everything from 
controlling the entire oil market to having 
absolutely no impact on global oil prices. In 
examining the oil market, it can be seen that 
neither of these absolutes are true. As the 
research will show, the truth lies somewhere 
in the middle.  
OPEC has been said to have 
completely caused a shortage of oil and the 
resulting price shock during the early and 
late 1970s. In fact, Arab OPEC countries did 
embargo oil exports to countries that were 
allies of Israel in the Arab-Israeli War but 
this was only one of several factors that 
ultimately contributed to a raise in the price 
of oil. Even during this time oil imports 
from OPEC producing nations were 
increasing (See Figure 1). Some other 
factors included political reaction, interest 
rates, and production shifts (See Figure 2). 
In response to the Arab oil embargo of 1973 
and 1974 Congress imposed a price ceiling 
of $.57 per gallon on gasoline (Case and 
Fair 78). This artificial ceiling limited the 
available supply of oil and caused a 
shortage. Interest rates were also climbing 
rapidly which affected overall price of oil 
(Heal and Chichilnisky, 2-5). In addition, 
the production of oil was switching hands 
from seven major international oil 
companies to the governments of the 
countries where the oil was located. In 
anticipation of this change the major oil 
companies had been overproducing oil to 
shore up their reserves before they were 
removed from the countries. This led to the 
perception of a shortage because the newly 
installed government overseers were not 
producing as much as the major companies 
had been (Heal and Chichilnisky, 58-62). 
Without taking these other factors into 
consideration, it is easy, albeit not accurate, 
to point to OPEC as the cause of all price 
shocks during the 1970s. 
5
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Figure 1
United States Petroleum Imports
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Graph 1 Contributing Factors to Oil Crisis 
Figure 2 
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As Figure 1 shows the United States has 
been able to reduce their dependency on 
OPEC oil throughout the years. The U.S. 
now imports more from non-OPEC 
countries than they do from OPEC member 
nations. In addition, the U.S. has a strategic 
reserve of 550 million barrels of oil as of 
2001. This is held in case of a drop in 
imports or an embargo from oil producing 
nations that would threaten the United 
State’s available oil supply. The United 
States imports 27% of its oil and petroleum 
from OPEC so an embargo by OPEC would 
have an effect on available supply. The U.S. 
was 54% dependent on imported oil to meet 
its consumption demands in 2001 so the 
strategic reserve and oil producing 
capabilities of the U.S. would help to 
alleviate a drop in available import supply 
(Energy Information Administration, 
Department of Energy). It is anticipated that 
OPEC’s market share will continue to drop 
as they have ceded it to other countries in 
order to sustain their target prices 
(Williams). Obviously, OPEC is a major 
factor in the U.S. oil market; however, the 
U.S. is not nearly as dependent on them as 
they once were. 
124 
 2003 
When examining OPEC in terms of 
an oligopoly, several unique factors must be 
taken into consideration. The first is their 
ability to influence market prices rather than 
take it as given. Oligopoly pricing strategies 
will cause prices to be above the competitive 
market price in some circumstances and 
below the market price in others (Heal and 
Chichilnisky, 8-12). Heal and Chichilnisky 
(8) state “Monopoly in the oil market cannot 
result in prices uniformly higher than 
competitive prices at all dates.” Further, 
“this is a sharp contrast to the usual static 
microeconomic theory of monopoly, where 
a monopolist sells less output than a 
competitor, at a higher price.” It is not in the 
advantage of a profit-maximizing firm to 
sell product uniformly above or below 
market price. In a competitive market total 
consumption equals total supply. Selling 
above the market price will leave an 
oligopoly with unsold goods and lost 
revenue in the long term. This is 
incompatible with maximization of profits. 
There are competitive and political reasons 
that could motivate an oligopoly to price 
above or below market prices, but it would 
not be to their benefit as a profit-maximizing 
firm to do so. In OPEC’s case in particular, 
it would be dangerous to set oil price higher 
than the market could bear. In examining a 
traditional monopoly, neo-classical 
economics only takes into account partial 
equilibrium (one market at a time). Theory 
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of partial equilibrium states that an 
oligopoly is able to set an output price 
without worrying about how it would affect 
the general equilibrium (whole market) 
(Heal and Chichilnisky, 38-39). Most OPEC 
nations are reliant on imports from the same 
industrial countries that they are exporting 
oil to. For example, if OPEC raised the price 
of oil above market prices, then the price of 
imports to their countries would also rise. In 
fact, research shows that the real price of oil 
from OPEC countries needs to be relative to 
what those countries import (Heal and 
Chichilnisky, 39-41): 
  real price of oil from OPEC 
countries = x/a 
 x = OPEC influence on 
price of oil 
 a = non-OPEC influence 
on price of oil + 
  OPEC trading 
partners’ exported goods price 
 
  Research indicates that while OPEC 
may be able to influence market prices it 
may not be in their advantage to do so. The 
research will next examine the power of 
their cartel given that the member nations 
have divided interests. Countries with small 
amounts of oil reserves, such as Iran and 
Iraq (Hawks), generally want to obtain 
higher prices rather than increase demand. 
Countries with large reserves, such as Saudi 
Arabia (Doves), would rather protect the 
longevity of their supplies by ensuring that 
demand remains constant. They also have 
the monetary wealth to spare. In fact, in 
1980 there was a disagreement within OPEC 
as to the target price of $34/barrel. The 
Saudis believed that this price was too high, 
and, between 1980 and 1982, as most OPEC 
countries were cutting back, Saudi Arabia 
was increasing their exports in an attempt to 
drive prices down (See Figure 3). Once 
OPEC reduced its official price, Saudi 
Arabia cut back significantly on their 
production to maintain the agreed-upon 
price (Heal and Chichilnisky, 48-49). This 
lack of solidarity in all situations decreases 
the oligopoly power of OPEC significantly. 
OPEC’s role as an oligopoly can be 
questioned because of these special factors, 
and they must be taken into consideration 
when examining OPEC’s power in the 
market. 
 Price and income elasticity of 
demand for oil plays an interesting role in 
the market as well. In the short-run, demand 
is relatively inelastic and unresponsive with 
respect to price. This happens because the 
market has no way to react drastically in the 
short term. In the long term, however, oil 
9
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demand has a tendency to be very elastic 
(Heal and Chichilnisky, 27-30). A higher 
price will force lower demand through more 
efficient technologies (discussed in next 
section) and methods, but it will take a 
period of time for these to appear. Effects of 
the income elasticity of demand are seen 
much sooner. In the industrial sector, energy 
consumption rises as national income rises. 
More economic activity results in an 
increase in production, revenue, and a rise in 
demand. Households respond similarly as 
there is a bare minimum amount of energy a 
household will use. Beyond that, oil is a 
complimentary good to many normal goods, 
and there will be an increase in demand as 
income rises (although it will not be 
proportional). The following research 
displays how technology can affect this 
elasticity. 
 
Backstop Technologies 
As was discussed earlier, technology 
can affect demand by creating more efficient 
means of consumption. Backstop technology 
is defined as a technology that would be 
used to produce unlimited supplies of a 
perfect substitute for oil at a price. Fusion 
power, shale oil, and other synthetic fuels 
have been considered at one time or another 
as a backstop technology (Heal and  
CS&P Vol 1, Num 2  May 2003 
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P1 
Saudi Arabia increased oil supply in order maintain lower prices and 
steady demand. The MC curve can be seen as the supply curve for the 
cartel. It states the agreed upon supply schedule for the cartel. This 
move by Saudi Arabia, although beneficial to the global market, 
brought to question solidarity of the cartel during that time. 
Source: Heal and Chichilnisky
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Chichilnisky, 17). Since there are currently 
no feasible backstop technologies available, 
this will remain theoretical. If a backstop 
technology were discovered it would play a 
very interesting role in the oil market. The 
price of the backstop technology would 
immediately become the price ceiling for 
oil. In a competitive market system, the 
price of oil would rise along with interest 
rates until it reached the price of the 
backstop (Heal and Chichilnisky, 18). At 
this point, the backstop would take over as a 
replacement for oil. In a monopolistic 
market, the monopoly, acting as a profit-
maximizing firm, would most likely follow 
the same path as the competitive market. 
The only difference would come about if the 
monopoly decided to use limit pricing to 
raise the price of oil to just below the price 
of the backstop technology. This would limit 
the entry of competition into the market, but 
it poses a risk because the elasticity of oil 
becomes very great at higher prices (Heal 
and Chichilnisky, 21). A small change in the 
price of the backstop technology could push 
the price of oil above the ceiling; at which 
point, there would be zero demand for oil. 
The rate of research towards a backstop 
technology varies depending on the price of 
oil. In the 1970s there was a surge of 
research into oil alternatives including 
fusion, shale oil, and synthetic fuels (Heal 
and Chichilnisky, 24). Research slowed as 
prices dropped, and, in the 1990s oil glut, it 
is possible to see a step backwards as SUVs 
and other gas-guzzling vehicles skyrocket in 
popularity. Public policy and subsidies have 
the potential to dictate how further research 
is handled, unless scarcity of oil or 
environmental factors push advancements 
without the need for governmental 
involvement. 
 
Daly’s Options for the Promotion of 
Sustainable Development 
 As the data and research clearly 
show, OPEC has considerable but not total 
market share. In his article, “Sustainable 
Development and OPEC”, Herman Daly 
proposes a plan that would effectually levy 
more monopoly power into the hands of the 
OPEC cartel. It is a scary thought at first 
glance. However, when reviewed in the 
context of sustainable development, the 
argument becomes more appealing. Daly 
views the production of oil as being two 
separate but interdependent markets: the 
source function (market) and the sink 
function (market). The source function is 
that which supplies the oil. The sink 
function is that which charges for the output 
of carbon-dioxide from burning a barrel of 
CS&P Vol 1, Num 2  May 2003 
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petroleum. This is similar to the total charge 
a customer pays for water, water supply and 
sewerage fees (Daly, 6). 
 “New institutions are being designed 
to take the sink function out of the open 
access regime and recognize its scarcity 
(Kyoto)” (Daly, 5). “OPEC assuming it 
could increase its degree of monopoly of the 
source, may be in a position to preempt the 
function of the failing Kyoto accord by 
incorporating sink rents, and even 
externalities, into the prices at the source 
end of the petroleum throughput” (Daly, 6). 
Essentially what this means is that there 
would be an added charge to the price of oil 
that OPEC would collect, which would 
increase price and decrease demand for oil. 
This added charge in the form of sink rents 
could then be distributed to developing 
countries of the South. 
“In addition to effecting this transfer, 
the expanded role of OPEC as global 
fiduciary might increase the willingness of 
other petroleum producers (e.g. Norway) to 
join OPEC, thus increasing its monopoly 
power and ability to function as here 
envisioned.” (Daly, 7) OPEC then would 
have monopolistic powers over the source 
market and the sink market and would then 
be expected, as Daly states, to act “as a 
global fiduciary on the sink side” controlling 
the “net flow of sink rents from North to 
South.” OPEC has already formed the 
OPEC Development Fund, which is a 
donation based fund created to “promote 
cooperation between OPEC member 
countries and other developing countries as 
an expression of South-South solidarity” and 
to “help particularly the poorer, low-income 
countries in pursuit of their social and 
economic advancement” (OPEC Fund). 
Daly continues with an explanation 
of the difficulties in assigning or 
determining costs to sink rents.  He suggests 
that “since the sink side is now the more 
limiting function...it should be as much as 
the source rents.” These sink rents would 
then be included in an “expanded OPEC 
Development Fund dedicated entirely to 
global sustainable development in poor 
countries, especially investments in 
renewable energy efficiency” (Daly, 7). This 
option does however inherently contain 
some distinct ethical concerns and feasibility 
issues. These concerns will be discussed in 
the following two sections. 
 
Feasibility of Daly’s Proposal 
 The definition of a feasible plan or 
proposition is one that is capable of being 
accomplished or brought about. There are 
several obstacles in Daly’s proposal that 
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threaten its feasibility. The first is the 
conflict of interest between OPEC’s stated 
economic goals and the outcomes of Daly’s 
proposal. OPEC states that “We need to 
invest in oil exploration and development in 
order to have production capacity available 
as demand rises in the years ahead, but we 
also need to be sure that there will be 
enough demand for that oil and that we will 
get a reasonable price.” The outcomes of 
Daly’s proposal will increase price thus 
decreasing demand. 
 This increase in price has the 
potential to spur research and development 
towards a new backstop technology. As 
discussed earlier, once the price of a 
backstop technology reached the price of oil, 
oil would become perfectly elastic. This 
would nullify any effect that Daly’s 
proposed sink tax might have because the 
tax would not be applied to the new 
technology. In theory, this backstop 
technology would also bring the global 
consumption of oil down to a more 
sustainable level. 
 The final question of the feasibility 
of Daly’s proposal dealt with in this paper 
has to do with OPEC operating as a global 
fiduciary. Daly proposes using an expanded 
version of the currently existing OPEC Fund 
for International Development to facilitate 
the distribution of sink rents from the North 
to the South. As stated above, one of OPEC 
Fund’s goals is to “promote cooperation 
between OPEC member countries and other 
developing countries as an expression of 
South-South solidarity” (OPEC Fund). 
However, it appears that the OPEC Fund is 
more of a loan broker to the South rather 
than an aid distributor. Only 6% of the 
US$4,274.5 million in disbursements from 
the OPEC Fund were given in the form of 
grants. A significant majority of the money 
was used to fund loans to encourage 
development in the South (OPEC Fund). In 
this regard, it appears that the OPEC Fund 
may be nothing more than a smaller version 
of the IMF or World Bank. 
 
Ethical Considerations of Daly’s Proposal 
 There are several important ethical 
factors to consider when evaluating the 
plausibility of Daly’s suggestions. Is it 
ethical for the world to place more power 
into the hands of an already powerful cartel? 
Can the same cartel be trusted to administer 
a fund whose main purpose would be to 
funnel millions of dollars into developing 
countries? Who exactly would be the 
recipient of funds collected as a sink tax? Is 
there a global organization, such as the 
U.N., capable of the kind of oversight that 
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would be necessary for such a program? 
Could the global community agree to an 
equitable plan that was both efficient and 
effective? How would this increase in price 
through tax affect local consumers and how 
would they feel about paying money into a 
tax that would most likely never be spent in 
their own country? The questions that could 
be raised are almost endless so our research 
will only discuss a few choice ones below. 
 As our research has shown, OPEC 
plays a significant, although not total, role in 
the American oil market. In order for Daly’s 
suggestion to be effective, the U.S. would 
need to have a large majority of their oil 
come from OPEC countries. The easiest way 
to do this would be to have non-OPEC 
countries such as Norway and Canada join 
the cartel in order to further their control of 
the market. These countries have 
traditionally been resistant to joining OPEC, 
but a concept such as sustainable 
development might just be the motivation 
needed in order to have them join the cartel. 
It has also been suggested that in a total 
monopoly of natural resources “prices to 
consumers would be fixed lower than the 
long-run interests of the public would 
justify.” (Ise, 1925). Such a monopoly 
seems much more favorable to consumers 
once you take into account oil’s non-
renewable nature and continuing scarcity. 
 Having the same monopoly 
responsible for the sale of oil, collection of a 
sink tax, and distribution of the same tax 
could pose problems with conflict of 
interest. It would be very easy for the 
interests of the profit-maximizing cartel to 
become confused with the goal of 
sustainable development. OPEC has already 
created a separate non-profit group that is 
uses to support developing countries. The 
OPEC Fund is in a very unique place to 
assist in the administration of monies 
collected from a sink tax. With some 
oversight from an international group, such 
as the U.N., it could be assured that the 
goals of the sink tax program were being 
met in an equitable and efficient manner. 
Yearly audits and other standard accounting 
practices administered by the U.N. could be 
used to quantify how much money was 
collected and how it was used. 
 As has been seen recently with both 
the Kyoto Treaty and the WSSD in South 
Africa, the international community is not 
always prepared to act in unison on matters 
such as sustainable development and 
environmental damage. In particular, the 
U.S. has done very little to curb their 
consumption of petroleum products and, 
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Conclusion with their withdrawal from the Kyoto 
Treaty, there appears to be no immediate 
plans to do so. The sink tax would correct 
the market failure and force action on the 
U.S. without having to worry about 
complete international agreement on the 
issue. Market forces would then take effect, 
and, most likely, oil consumption and prices 
would become more realistic for a polluting, 
non-renewable product. 
 The amount of data and prior 
research done on both OPEC and sustainable 
development is enormous to say the least. 
Because of time and size limitations, this 
paper is only able to touch on the issues 
presented. Given more time, the researchers 
would have tried to explore ways of 
quantifying the sink market. They would 
have also liked to explore the ethical 
considerations prompted by the apparent 
inequity in the relationships of developed 
nations who consume oil and undeveloped 
nations who produce oil. The researchers 
also recognize that Daly’s suggestions for 
OPEC monopolization and the creation of a 
sink tax to spur sustainable development 
would cause a raise in price and a drop in 
demand for oil. This is in direct conflict with 
OPEC’s own stated vision: “We need to 
invest in oil exploration and development in 
order to have production capacity available 
as demand rises in the years ahead, but we 
also need to be sure that there will be 
enough demand for that oil and that we will 
get a reasonable price.” 
 Once these market forces were in 
effect, local consumers would be hit hard 
with increased prices both at the gasoline 
pump and in products that relied on 
petroleum in their production process. 
Daly’s model has most of the money from 
taxes flowing from the North to the South to 
be used in developing countries. Thus, 
American consumers would pay significant 
amounts of money that would not be spent 
for improvements in the U.S. Daly’s 
proposal assumes that it is in the best 
interest of the less developed countries of 
the South to mirror the growth pattern that 
the countries of the North have exhibited. 
Unfortunately, all consumers of oil are 
contributing to the reduction of sink 
resources, and the only equitable solution 
appears to be one in which the consumers 
are helping to offset their own consumption. 
 Given this, does OPEC have the 
power to implement measures to enact the 
concept of sustainable development? The 
researchers believe that in the current market 
OPEC does not have the power to  
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implement Daly’s proposal for sustainable 
development nor is it feasible or ethical for 
them to do so. Economic analysis of 
OPEC’s power in the oil market clearly 
shows that OPEC does not have the total 
control necessary to enact Daly’s proposal. 
Because of OPEC’s stated economic goals, 
backstop technology, and OPEC Fund’s role 
as a loan broker, Daly’s proposal lacks 
feasibility. Finally, the ethical concerns that 
arise from such a proposal make it 
impossible to implement. These concerns 
include the conflict of interest of OPEC 
acting as a global fiduciary and Daly’s 
assumption that the South should mirror the 
development patterns of the North. 
 Using this paper and its conclusions 
as a starting off point, there are many 
avenues for future research to explore. The 
issues of gender equality and wealth 
distribution in OPEC nations are prime 
examples. Given that oil is the primary 
factor in GDP for many of the OPEC 
nations, it would be interesting to examine 
how the measures discussed in this paper 
would affect local culture. There are also 
obvious environmental issues that could be 
further explored such as sink resources and 
renewable energy resources. 
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